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RightASIAN DEVELOPlNG COUNTRIES AND PAFTA = 
DEVELOPMENT, AID AND TRADE PREFERENCES* 
By KIYOSHI KOJIMA** 
I. A New Stage in the North-South Problems 
The second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) at New 
Delhi in February-March 1968 d d 'th frustration and disappointment for the developing  , , en e wr 
countries.1 This was not surprising since it was held at a very unfavourable time when the 
developed countries were involved in difiiculties of their own such as the devaluation of ster-
ling, the gold crisis, and a rising tide of restrictive and protectionist foreign trade and aid 
policies in the United States. The main positive achievement of the conference was an agree-
ment to proceed wrth the establishment of a "General System of PreLerences" for developing 
country exports of manufactures, to be worked out in the course of 1968-69 and, hopefully, 
An important question arises. How effective is a global approach to the North-South 
problem likely to be ? It is doubtful whether a multi-country meeting of this scale can sub-
stitute for more intensive negotations between a small number of countries. The problems 
raised by the persistence of the basic cleavages of interests both within and between the two 
g'roups of developed and less developed countries are multiplied by more than the number of 
countries involved.2 Even if agreement could be reached, concessions are likely to be severely 
limited and of nominal value. It is urgently necessary to formulate a more effective and 
constructive approach to the problem. A regional approach in which like-minded countries, 
from both tlle developed and less developed group, to foster trade development among them-
sclves seems more promising. However, a regional approach can not be a substitute for a 
global approach to development problems, Rather, it represents an effective step towards the 
global approach. 
Currently, the North-South problem seems to be facing a turning point : there is a shift 
in emphasis from aid and trade expansion of a "vent for surplus" type to that of a "structural 
adjustment" type. 
In the last decade, Iess developed countries sought as much aid as possible from the de-
veloped countries. This aid was mainly used to provide social overhead capital and to fill 
the gap in the trade balance incurred by accelerated imports of capital equipment. In short, 
* Th's  l paper was originally presented at "Second Pacific T d d Development Conference" held on  ra e an 
January 8-11, 1969 in Honolulu by the East.West Center. 
** Professor (Kyo~ju) of International Economics. 
l UNCTAD, The Sigmfuance ofthe Second Session of UNC'rAD, report to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations. TD/96, 7 May 1968. 
2 See, for example. David Howell, "Failure at UNCTAD II," The Round Table. July 1968, pp. 249-253. 2 I{ITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [June 
it was not really directed towards increasing exports. However, foreign substantial debts have 
accumulated in many developing countries and repayments and service charges surpass new 
borrowings. Thus, in addition to increased aid and a softening of terms of aid, the expan-
sion of exports from developing countries is an urgent task. 
Since economic development in many developing countries has been confined to invest-
ment of the "infrastructural" type and the establishment of import-substituting industries, ex-
ports have continued to consist mainly of traditional primary products. These exports have 
suffered from a declining importance in total world trade and also from severe fluctuation in 
their prices. Prospects for these exports look even worse because of the rapid growth in the 
supply of synthetic substitutes and the world-wide tendency towards trade liberalization both 
of which make things even harder for the lovv-quality, high-cost type of exports of the de-
veloping countries. 
Thus, developing countries must turn to the expansion of export-oriented productive 
activities. The expansion of exports, not only in speciality tropical goods but also in certain 
labour-intensive manufactured and semi-manufactured goods, appropriate to the factor endow-
ment ratio in developing countries now seems the most promising line of economic develop-
ment. Developing countries have to shift the emphasis from receiving aid to the expansion 
of exports, and from agricultural exports to a structural transformation of their economies 
towards the export of manufactures. 
Developed countries should take appropriate measures to facilitate structural transforma-
tion in developing countries. However, in the last decade, developed countries have confined 
themselves significantly to providing the vent-for-surplus type aid. U.S. aid in the form of 
surplus agricultural products under Public Law 480 is one good example. To take another 
example, Japanese aid has so far been provided mainly for the purpose of increasing her 
own exports of heavy manufactures and chemicals. Japanese reparations to Asian countries 
up to about 1960 were directed towards stimulating the expansion of newly established heavy 
industries and at the same time absorbing a large amount of unemployed labour. Aid from 
developed countries has been provided partly because there has been surplus produce or 
surplus capacity in resources, and aid has served as the vent for these surpluses. 
Since about 1960, developed countries, including Japan, have been subject to more in-
flationary pressure. Aid of the vent-for-surplus type could not be continued easily. A new 
concept of aid and new aid policies have become necessary. 
New types of aid and access for the exports of the developing countries to the markets 
of the developed countries should be provided by means of the structual adjustment of in-
dustries in developed countries. The developed countries would be better off substituting the 
production of a number of domestic industries for imports from the developing countries. 
There are certainly some "declining" industries in the developed countries which are so old 
and inefficient that, from all the criteria of comparative advantage and efficiency in resource 
allocation, it would be better to phase out of existence. Productive resources thus released 
should then be transferred to promising growth industries, effective demand for the products 
of which would be increased as a result of the successful economic development in less de-
veloped countries. Given that full employment is maintained, this sort of structural adjust-
ment in the developed countries is the only real way to increase national incomes. Moreover, 
only this kind of structural adjustment in developed countries could create room for expand-
ing exports from developing countries. Structural adjustment on both sides is required in lg69] ASIAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND PAFTA DEVELOPMENT AID AND TRADE PREFERENCES ~ 
order to achieve a "new international division of labour" and the better utilization of world 
resources. 
Recently it was convincingly demonstrated by Hal B. Lary that "the ranking of industries 
by factor intensities is much the same from country to country, even from the most developed 
to the least developed. That is to say, the phenomenon of 'factor-intensity reversals' seems 
to be much less common, at least in manufacturing, than some other empirical studies would 
suggest."8 1 also have verified the validity of the factor-propor~ions theorem as regards 
exports of manufactures (74 commodities) from the U.S., Canada, Sweden, the U.K.. EEC 
and Japan.4 These studies lead to support the conclusion that the potentia] manufactured 
exports from less developed countries is promising, provided that a receptive and cooperative 
attitude is adopted by the importing countries and an appropriate export-oriented industrializa-
tion policies suited to their factor endowments are pursued by the less developed countries 
themselves "A d  . rea iness on both sides to share in the international division of labor among 
countries at varying levels of economic development"5 would assure successful growth in trade 
from less-developed to developed countries. 
One of the most important consequences of the validity of the factor-proportions theorem 
is that trade in manufactured goods throughout the world should be liberalized. This liber-
alization is necessary to maximize world productivity by providing increased opportunities for 
international division of labour in manufacturing industries among countries at different stages of 
economic development and possessing different factor endowments. This means that advanced 
countries should abolish the protection given to their declining labour-intensive industries, as 
rapidly as possible, transferring the production of these goods to less developed countries. 
To achieve "a new international division of labour",6 the growth of promising manufacturing 
industries suited to the factor-proportions of the less developed countries should be assisted 
by capital and technological aid and by the extension of tariff preferences. 
Structural adjustment in developed countries is an essential element if new development 
policies are to be successful. Structural adjustment is also a key factor in the liberalization 
of trade and the establishment of a free trade area among the advanced countries. How can 
this structural adjustment be undertaken effectively ? Strong resistance, both economic and 
political, can be expected. Various steps will have to be taken to assist the adjustment, along 
the lines of those under the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the amended act of 1968. 
There are two measures that would assist the adjustments desired. First, a fund for 
assisting structural adjustment should be established in every advanced country. This should 
become an international obligation similar to the one per cent of national income foreign aid 
target. A certain per cent (say, a quarter of one per cent) of national income could be 
collected through taxation for this purpose. The fund should be used for bringing about the 
3 Hal B. Lary, I,nports of Manufactures from Less Develo~~d Countries, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, New York, 1968, p. 19. Total value added per employee which is taken to represent the dif-
ference in capital-intensity in 13 industry groups is compared among 9 countries (the U. S., Canada, 
Australia, Sweden, the U. K., Japan. Brazil. Mexico, and India), and both Kendall's coefficient of concord-
ance (0.853) and chi-square test (92.12) are very significant (Ibid., p. 71). 
4 Kiyoshi Kojima, "Comparative Advantage among Industrial Countries: A Verification of the Factor. 
Proportions Theorem," (forthcoming). 
5 Hal B. Lary, ibid., Preface, p. xv. 
6 Harry G. Johnson. Econo,nic Po!icies Towal'd Less Develo~id Countries, Brookings Institution, 
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gradual elimination of uneconomic industries and the transfer of factors of production to more 
productive activities where the advanced country enjoys a comparative advantage. The optimum 
policy would be a "package" of subsidies to allow uncompetitive production to continue over 
the retirement period and of cash grants to finance the closing down of capacity. Facilities 
should be provided, in addition, for the retraining and movement of redundant labour. 
This fund would be more efficient than direct aid to developing countries for it could be 
used in the advanced countries for economic rationalization and thus raise national welfare in 
their own interests. In many advanced countries, slum clearance has been widely undertaken 
by governments. Why should not the reclamation of uneconomic industries be undertaken 
also ? 
Secondly, some safeguards for gradual running down of inefficient, heavily protected in-
dustries in the developed countries should be devised. A Tariff Board should be established 
in each developed country or preferably as an international institution, which obliged industries 
to justify their claim for continued protection by tariffs and quantitative controls. The sub-
sidies noted on an annual basis should replace tariff protection for uncornpetitive production. 
Each year subsidised producers could be required to make out a case as to why they should 
continue to receive cost-reducing subsidies rather than grants designed to facilitate the run-
ning down of their productive capacity.7 
In this way the burden of maintaining protected industries would fall on the consumers 
and taxpayers of the developed countries concerned rather than on the less developed countries 
and other exporters. Consumers in the developed countries would thus be more clearly aware 
of their interest in seeing uneconomic industries closed down and the harmful effects of tarif{s 
and quantitative restrictions than they seem to be at present. 
Careful investigation should be made as to how best to provide aid and preferences for 
the purpose of facilitating structural adjustment with the least friction and greatest incentives 
in the advanced and less developed countries alike. 
II. Directly Productive Aid 
I have advocated closer economic integration among the Pacific basin countries, preferably 
the formation of Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) but, as a first step, the establishment of 
an Organization for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD).8 Trade liberalization among 
the five advanced countries of the Pacific, the U.S.A.. Canada, Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand, would bring about a large expansion of intra-areal trade (as large as $ US 5,000 
millions or 28 per cent of intra-areal trade in 1965) which would be more significant than 
what can be expected through the Kennedy Round tariff reductions. Complete regional trade 
liberalization would appear to have considerable advantages over partial trade liberalization in 
world markets. Since another major round of global tariff reductions is not feasible within 
7 David Wall. The Third World Challenge, Prcferences for Develop,ne'tt, The Atlantic Trade Study, 
London, January 1968, pp. 61-62. 
8 Kiyoshi Kojima, "A Pacific Economic Community and Asian Developing Countries," Hitotsubashi 
Journal of Economics. June 1966, and "Japan's Interest in the Pacific Trade Expansion," Kiyoshi Kojima, 
ed.. Pactfa 7'rade a'Id Develop,nent. Japan Economic Research Center, February 1968 (reprinted in 
Hitotsubashi Journal ofEcono'nics, June 1968). Cf. G. C. Allen, Japan's Place in Trade Strategy, I.a'lg'e,' 
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the foreseeable future, the formation of a free trade area would seem to be an effective alter-
native for, and the only remaining practical road to, fostering world trade liberalization. 
Moreover, the formation of PAFTA or some such alternative is particularly desirable from 
the viewpoint of developing well harmonized and efficient trade and aid policies9 towards the 
less developed countries in the Pacific basin. If a PAFTA arrangement were established, the 
group of developed countries could (and should) offer associate membership to the less 
developed countries of the Pacific and provide the latter with aid, investment and trading privi-
leges. To increase aid and trade with less developed countries, what is most needed is struc-
tural adjustment of industries in the developed countries as explained above. 
The creation of PAFTA would imply that each member would be prepared eventually to 
adjust to full competition from the other member countries. This would certainly provide 
developed countrles with a great impetus to undertake structural reorganization and, if this 
could be started, it would not be difficult to include structural adjustments required to provide 
the less developed countries with wider markets. Each advanced country in isolation might 
be reluctant to grant aid and trading preferences to less developed countries on the scale 
required, either because of its lack of resources, or because it could not face alone the struc-
tural consequences for its own economy. Only harmonized and coordinated efforts among 
the advanced countries would make aid and trade expansion with less developed countries 
possible. The increased prosperity and higher incomes which the advanced Pacific countries 
would gain through PAFTA would provide them with additional resources which they could 
share with less developed countries of the Pacific. Only the process of rapid economic 
growth within the developed countries, stimulated to some extent by trade liberalization, makes 
possible structural adjustment. 
Aid and trade preferences should be provided from advanced to less developed countries 
of the Pacific in a direction which would accelerate most the structural adjustment needed on 
both sides. With this aim, it is strongly recommended that international economic aid should 
be increasingly provided to Asian (and Latin American) developing countries by the advanced 
Pacific countries in the form of machinery, equipment, fertilizer, and other capital goods for 
directly productive (preferably export-oriented) activities in the coming decade. Both humani-
tarian and infrastructural aid which were the main form of aid in the past can continue to 
make an important contribution in the future, but in addition to these types of aid directly 
productive aid is more urgently required now. As mentioned above, it can be expected that 
an increase in directly productive aid will have several beneficial effects not only for the 
developing countries but also for the donor countries.10 
Suppose there was an outright grant of $US 1,000 millions annually for the coming ten 
years, in addition to the current level of aid, to the Asian developing countries from the five 
advanced countries of the Pacific specifically for the purpose of the importation of machinery, 
equipment, fertilizers, and other capital goods. This would certainly stimulate the expan-
sion of heavy and chemical industries in advanced countries, and many other indirect effects 
9 See. David Wall, The Third World Challenge, Preferences for Development, The Atlantic 
Study London January 1968 and "Markets for the Underdeveloped," The Round Table, October 
pp. 406-4ov. 
Io A more detailed explanation is presented in Kiyoshi Kojima, "A Proposal for International 
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could be anticipated. 
Private capital investment in the developing countries should also increase, if the capital 
requirements of new manufacturing industries, which need such large and risky investments 
that private firms sometimes hesitate to undertake the investment, are met by international 
grants and, in addition, if preferential treatment, of their exports by the advanced countries 
is assured. Private capital would assist in estak]lishing a series of ancillary, interrelated, or 
higher-stage processing industries. For example, a big cotton spinning mill could be estab-
lished by international grants; then the weaving and clothing industries might be supplemented 
by foreign private as well as local capital. The mill would produce yarn cheaply, owing to 
low capital costs, and ancillary and interrelated industries would become profitable. 
Private capital investment from advanced countries would be stimulated. Increases both 
in the directly productive aid and in the private capital investment would directly, and in 
addition the "acceleration effect" indirectly, create a new demand for heavy and chemical 
industries in the advanced countries. Moreover, the expansion of those industries would have 
multiplied income effects resulting in further additional demand. 
A substantial expansion of heavy and chemical industries in the advanced countries could 
provide a stimulus large enough to reallocate resources in such a way as to expedite a rapid 
transfer of labour and capital (with the aid of acljustment assistance, if necessary) from agri-
culture and light manufactures of a labour-intensive type to heavy and chemical industries, 
that is, from comparatively disadvantageous to advantageous industries. Both the structural 
adjustments and increased national income in the advanced countries would enlarge the scope 
for importing certain kinds of agricultural products and light manufactures of a labour-inten-
sive type from developing countries. Thus, if both the necessary capital goods, including 
technical know-how and managerial skill, and markets are provided, the expansion of export-
oriented activities in the developing countries wili be assured of success. 
To sum up, my proposal for increasing international econornic aid towards the provision 
of directly productive capital goods would have three distinct advantages. (1) It would pro-
vide the developing countries with the means necessary to expand export-oriented activities. 
(2) In the advanced countries, it would lead to a reallocation of resources towards heavy and 
chemical industries in which they possess a comparative advantage. (3) The expansion of 
heavy industries stimulated, in the advanced countries, by the increase in demand for capital 
goods in the developing nations, would provide the markets necessary for growing export 
industries in the latter. Thus, the international division of labour wou]d move closer towards 
an optimum. 
III. Agricultural Development In Asran Developlng Countnes 
Although the expansion of the exports of manufactures suited to their abundant supply 
of labour is becoming the most promising path to long-term development for Asian develop-
ing countries, agricultural development is an eve.n more urgent task in order to economize 
foreign exchange, to increase export earnings and to feed their people better and elevate their 
will to work. Pacific advanced countries (PAO should provide extensive directly productive 
aid to facilitate agricultural development in Asian developing countries. 
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Although the countries of Southeast Asia, such as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the 
Republic of Korea, are agricultural countries they suffer from severe food-shortages and import 
foodstuffs to the approximate annual value of $US 1.000 millions from advanced countries in 
tlle Pacific area such as America, Australia and Canada. Although some of these imports 
are available in the form of American surplus agricultural aid, this is excercising a serious 
pressure on their already unfavourable balance-of-payments position. What is more, when 
future increases in population and per-capita consumption are taken into consideration, these 
countries will require a large increase in production, equivalent approximately $US 3,500 
millions per annum, and foodstuffs to the value of approximately $US 1,000 millions will 
have to be procured in addition to the plans for increased production already tabled by the 
governments concerned. There is an urgent need to improve the food-producing capacity of 
those Asian countries in order to cover the $US 2,000 millions deficit in foodstuffs-the $US 
1,000 millions already being imported from the advanced countries plus the $US 1,000 millions 
worth of additional production. The provision of chemical fertilizer aid and the construction 
of fertilizer factories would seem the best method of attacking this problem. 
Advanced countries of the Pacific area should shift the emphasis in their agricultural 
assistance programs from the provision of foodstuffs themselves to the provision of fertilizer 
aid. While the supply of surplus agricultural products under the American PL 480 program 
is very useful for relief in times of famine, it has made little contribution to impro~'ing agri-
cultural productivity in Southeast Asia. On the contrary, it has even tended to impair the 
morale of the local peasants. Fertilizer aid and the building of fertilizer factories involve 
much lower expenditure than assistance in foodstuffs. Today, now that America's stocks of 
surplus agricultural products are beginning to dry up, a switch towards emphasis on fertilizer 
aid would be advantageous. 
A number of facts already testify that crop yields increase greatly if chemical fertilizers 
are applied appropriately. While production of rice per hectare is more than four tons in 
Japan, and around three tons both in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan which follow Japan, 
in the other countries of Southeast Asia yields are only about 1.2 tons per hectare, the lowest 
being India with 0.4 tons per hectare. The yield per hectare is clearly related to the quanti-
ties of fertilizers used, Iow productivity being caused by the virtual non-application of fertilizer. 
To take another example, of the total increase in food production of 11.2 million tons provided 
for under the second Indian Five-Year Plan (1956-61), 4.6 million tons of ahnost half was 
estimated to be produced by the increased use of chemical fertilizers. 
For chemical fertilizer to be used effectively it is of course necessary that irrigation and 
drainage facilities should be provided in advance. Although not all Southeast Asia is ready 
to employ fertilizers, a fairly extensive area is. Increased production should be brought about 
by increased use of fertilizers, beginning in the regions in which the pre-conditions have been 
established. At the same time technical advice about the use of fertilizers, insecticide, and 
irnproving the seed strains should also be made available. It is an encouraging fact that 
superior seed strains such as IR-8 and ADT-27 have been developed and successfully used 
over a wide area. The diffusion of these modern agricultural inputs will take a long time 
and will need assiduous technical help and institutional reform, but they have already offered 
great hope for progress in Southeast Asia. 
The main features of the scheme for fertilizer aid are as follows : 
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value of $US 300 millions over a five-year period, to the countries of Southeast Asia which 
are in a position to use them. 
2) The countries which receive these gifts of fertilizer should sell it at appropriate prices 
to the farmers, and should accumulate the proceeds as counterpart funds. 
3) At an appropriate time factories for the production of fertilizers should be set up in 
the aid-receiving countries. When this is done the counterpart funds should be used to pay 
for such local expenses as acquisition of land, Iocal labour costs, the remuneration of PAC 
personnel dispatched, etc. The equipment required in setting up these factories should be 
supplied from PAC on a long-term, deferred-payment basis. 
4) The counterpart funds should be used for the following purposes in addition to the 
construction of fertilizer factories: a) additional or supplementary irrigation works directly 
necessary for fertilizer application: b) running expenses necessary for PAC's agricultural 
technical cooperation activities (experimental centers, pilot or model farms, 'technical direction, 
extension work with improved strains of seed, etc; c) the purchase of agricultural machinery 
and implements, seeds, insecticide, etc; d) the establishment of fertilizer storage and trans-
portation facilities. 
In summary, this is an aid formula under which fertilizers' (especially nitrogenous ferti-
lizer) for which PAC has a surplus productive capacity are flrst given as gifts, followed by 
which fertilizers factories will be built for the aid-receiving countries with the help of their 
counterpart funds and capital supplied under deferred-payment arrangements. 
For example, if in the first year $US 60 millions worth of fertilizer aid were given to 
India and Pakistan respectively, in the second year, two standard factories with a daily ca-
pacity of 600 tons of ammonium and 1,000 tons of urea could be built in each country. The 
cost of building one of these factories is estimated at $US 25 millions for the plant, and about 
$US 15 millions for local costs (to be met out of counterpart funds). In addition to this, 
during the second year both Indonesia and the Philippines should each be given gifts of fer-
tilizers to the value of $US 30 millions. In the third year, two fertilizer factories should be 
built in each of these two countries. In the small countries of Southeast Asia, it would, of 
course, be proper to make the fertilizer factories small-scale ones of half, or quarter, of the 
capacity of the standard factories. It would also be possible to effect exchanges among the 
countries receiving fertilizers and countries building factories with their counterpart funds (e.g. 
by excllanging fertilizers produced in India for Burmese or Thai rice), a variety of flexible 
applications of the scheme being conceivable. 
Fertilizer aid at the rate of $US 60 millions yearly, or $US 300 millions over five years, 
seems modest both from point of view of PAC_'s ability to meet the burden and its surplus 
capacity in fertilizer production. This aid alone would be probably be sufficient to make up 
the whole of the $US 2,000 millions increase in food production required by Southeast Asia, 
which was mentioned above. It is to be hoped that other advanced countries in Western 
Europe would also participate in the fertilizer aid scheme. 
PAC would not only be enabled to carry through a meaningful aid program aimed at the 
solution of the most urgent problem of food shortage in the countries of Southeast Asia, but 
the deferred-payments scheme would also enable PAC to export fertilizer plants and equip-
ment valued at as much as $US 500 millions over a five-year period. Once the farmers of 
Southeast Asia became thoroughly familiar with the use of fertilizers and conscious of their 
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commercial exports of fertilizers from PAC could be stimulated. 
(ii) A Program for Cash Crop Plantations 
There is a strong desire for industrialization in the countries of Southeast Asia, but as 
capital equipment imports for the purposes of industrialization are costly developing countries 
cOmmonly fall into serious balance-of-payments difiiculties. If along with the above-mentioned 
increased food production, which reduces the demand for foreingn exchange, it were possible 
to enlarge exports of such cash crops as raw cotton and sugar, their additional foreign ex-
change earnings would become available for the promotion of economic development. 
There is considerable scope for the Pacific advanced countries to switch the imports of 
raw materials and foodstuffs from otller advanced countries in the Pacific or Europe to Asian 
developing countries for those primary products which can be produced in Asian developing 
countries competitively in terms of quality, price, delivery, etc. Between five and ten years 
should be allowed for the developing countries to improve productivity and to increase export 
capacity. For advanced countries too, some time will be required for adjusting their industrial 
and employment structures.' 
The possibilities for switching sources of supply are especially great in Japan's case. 
Japan will have to import increasingly large quantities 'of raw materials, fuels and foodstuffs 
to sustain its expanding economy. In 1965, Japan imported two-thirds of its total consump-
tion of energy-mostly in the form of petroleum. Japan will continue to import most of the 
iron ore and non-ferrous metal ores it requires. 
Its imports of raw cotton and raw wool may decline somewhat, but Japan must continue 
to rely on imports for its entire consumption of these raw materials. In 1966, Iumber was 
Japan's second largest import, coming only after petroleum, and imports will further increase 
in the years to come. Imports of animal feeds such as maize and kaoliang are rapidly in-
creasing. In 1966, Japan's fodder imports amounted to 5.7 million tons; and in the near 
future they will exceed the 10 million ton mark. Imports of oil seeds, sugar, bananas, and 
marine products will also expand. If Asian developing countries can produce these products 
efficiently, they will be able to expand their exports to Japan greatly.11 
For the U.S.A., Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the possibility of increasing imports 
of raw materials and foodstuffs from Asian developing countries may be limited only to their 
traditional imports from these countries, but rapid economic growth and structural adjustments 
in these advanced countries will induce fairly large increases in imports from Asian develop-
ing countries for those traditional goods. It is hoped that those advanced countries are able 
to refrain from expanding cornpetitive agricultural production through the abolition of support 
schemes and protection. 
For agricultural products which Japan is importing both from the advanced countries of 
the Pacific area and from Southeast Asia, possible increases in Japanese imports from South-
east Asia are expected to amount to about seven or eight hundred million dollars within the 
next five years, if one takes into account the possible trade diversion effects away from the 
advanced countries and towards imports from the developing countries envisaged by our plan 
as well as the influence of the general increase in imports projected for Japan during this 
five-year period. Increased demand for Asian agricultural products in other Pacific advanced 
countries will be approximately the same as in Japan, making a total of roughly $US 1,500 
ll Saburo Okita and Aklra Ohnishi, "Japan's Role in Asian Economic Development," Kiyoshi Kojima, 
ed., Pa!"fic 7,•ade and Devclr'p,,,cnt. Japan Economic Rescarch Center, Tokyo, 19r)8, pp. 3(~0-3ril. lO HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [June 
millions.12 It is desirable to have this met by increased production in Southeast Asia brought 
about by the eflicient use of directly-productive aid. Although it is not easy to estimate the 
amount of aid required, the importation of investment goods to be used in the agricultural 
development projects backed by Pacific advanced countries (PAC) alone would require $US 
240 millions. This figure is obtained from the estimates of the capital coefficient in Southeast 
Asia (1.6) and the foreign exchange requirement rate, (0.1), together with the projected total 
increase in demand for the agricultural products of Southeast Asia of $US 1,500 millions. If 
this sum is provided over a five-year period about $US 50 millions annually would be sufficient. 
As an efficient aid formula would be to grant funds and technology for the establishment 
and operation of cash crop plantations. Possible cash crops to be grown on these plantations 
would be cotton, maize, sugar, soybeans and tobacco. Here, however, I should like to con-
sider a plan for a cotton plantation company as a representative of such undertakings. 
1) The PAC would disburse aid at an annual rate of say, $US 30 millions or a total of 
$US 150 millions over five years in the form of technical cooperation expenses, and would 
set up a parent cotton plantation company. It would probably be best to entrust the running 
of the company's affairs to efficient private enterprise. 
2) The cotton plantation company would set up and run a number of cotton plantation 
joint enterprises organized with the help of local capital in suitable areas of Asia. 
3) As well as exercising control over the joint enterprises in their various locations the 
parent company could provide technical assistance and would send out technicians on an 
organized basis. At the same time it would carry on research in marketing and technical 
questions of common interest, and would make joint purchases of fertilizers, machinery, 
agricultural implements, etc. 
4) The cotton plantation joint enterprises set up in various parts of Asia would possess 
the following attributes : a) They would have at least one primary processing factory, i.e., 
a factory where the seed and waste are removed by ginning machines and the selected material 
made up in bales, and then would possess plantations sufficient in size to make possible efficient 
use of the factory, b) They could carry out positive direction in relation to the cotton pro-
duction carried on by peasant croppers in the vicinity of the plantation, buy up the raw cotton 
they produced, and carry out the primary processing, c) When a plurality of cotton plan-
tation joint enterprises had been established in various areas in Asia, they would take steps 
to consider differentiating the varieties of cotton grown by the various joint enterprises in 
response to the needs of the demand for raw cotton in both PAC and Southeast Asia and with 
a view to distributing risks. 
Japan imports most of her raw cotton from America at present, but it is quite possible 
from the technica] point of view to grow American cotton in almost all parts of Southeast 
Asia, and it is already being grown extensively in Pakistan. What is needed is a switch in 
Southeast Asian cotton production to the superior variety of cotton, modern production manage-
ment charactenzed by uniform quality quality supervrsron etc and reduced costs These 
should be the aims of the cotton plantation companies, and if they were achieved not oniy 
could PAC's imports of cotton from Asian developing countries be increased but it would also 
be possible to meet the demand for raw cotton which is rapidly increasing within Southeast Asia 
itself. 
12 Some estimates were attempted in Kiyoshi Kojima, "A Pacific Economic Community and Asian De-
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It would be possible to disburse PAC aid by the same method for the purpose of foster-
ing other cash crop plantations such as growing sugar, maize, soybeans, tobacco and other 
crops. A11 these industries would produce results quickly with comparatively little aid and 
contribute to the solution of Asian balance of payments problems. 
Concessions, and, positive support, by the advanced producing countries of the Pacific 
area will all be necessary to enquire the expansion of cash crop exports from Southeast Asia. 
The advanced countries will have to refrain from artificially stimulating their own exports, 
and, better still, to substitute imports from Southeast Asia for domestic production. What 
reaction will be forthcoming from the American cotton producer is the chief worry. But it 
seems advisable for America to effect a gradual change-over from cotton production, which 
in that country is in process of losing its comparative advantage because of high wages and 
rising costs, to other more profitable industrial activities, and furthermore that it might be 
more advantageous for American cotton growers to operate plantations in Southeast Asia 
where cheap labour is abundantly available. Thus, Southeast Asia should be given an appro-
priate role in changing the international division of labour. Similar adjustment are required 
in the production of American maize and soybeans and Australian sugar. 
"Fertilizer aid" and "cash crop plantations assistance" are two examples of aid which could 
be provided by the cooperative action of the Pacific advanced countries and implemented 
immediately perhaps with the help of the Asian Development Bank. These directly productive 
aid projects should be additional to aid already planned for other purposes since much aid is 
also required to equip a huge agricultural infrastructure comprising large scale irrigation works, 
transport and communications facilities, education, as well as for undertaking land reform. 
The present scheme stresses the importance of complementary aid which allows the fruits of 
infrastructural aid to be realized. 
The Pacific advanced countries should also assist with the development of mineral resources 
in Asian developing countries. This can be done best, however, mainly by private capital. 
Promising mineral resource developments in Asian developing countries are rather limited-
iron ore in India, petroleum in Indonesia, and copper in the Philippines. The development 
of mineral resources in Australia, Canada and Alaska presently appears less expensive and 
offers more stable supplies. 
IV. Aid cum Trade-Preferences 
Great faith has been put in general trade preferences to less developed countries as a 
means of increasing their export earnings and promoting their economic growth. Trade pref-
erences for developing countries are justifiable if divergence from the principle of non-dis-
crimination within GATT is temporary and if they foster liberalization of world trade. They 
are positively desirable if they encourage transformation in the international division of labour 
in such a way as to strengthen specialization in the export of labour intensive exports frorn 
developing countries. 
Will the general trade preferences bring about really substantial beneficial effects to devel-
oping countries as it is hoped they will ? This question should be looked into. 
(i) The Trade Creation Effects : Increases in Japan's Imports 
Increases in Japan's imports due to the extension of general preferences to developing 12 HITOTSUBASI{1 JOURNAL OF EcoNoMlcs [June 
countries are estimatedl3 according to the familiar model of tariff reductions, first, neglecting 
the trade diversion effects which other developed countries might suffer. Attention is focussed 
on the trade creation effects on Japanese imports. The estimate is attempted with regard to 
12 sensitive itemsl4 of interest to developing countries on the basis of 1964 trade figures. 
In 1964, developing country exports of these twelve commodities to Japan were valued at 
$US 3.69 millions which represented a 10 per cent share in the relevant Japanese markets. 
The estimates suggest that if tariffs were abolished on developing country exports to Japan, 
they would expand by $US 0.91 millions, or 2-4.7 per cent. Although the percentage increase 
appears large, the absolute size of the increase is relatively insignificant when compared with 
annual increases in Japanese exports of the order of $US 1,000 millions. The fact is that Japan 
still maintains a strong comparative advantage in traditional labour intensive manufacturing 
industries of the type most competitive with pote_ntial export industries in developing countries. 
It is true that in recent years, Japan's imports of manufactured goods from Hong Kong, 
Taiwan. Korea, Singapore and India have been increasing rapidly, but they are still insig-
nificant. However, taking this trend into account, and broadening the commodity coverage, 
it might be that around $US 50 millions worth of Japanese imports could be affected by the 
extension of trade preferences. If tariffs again<_t developing country exports were completely 
eliminated, imports would increase by $US 13 millions only. A fifty per cent tariff cut is 
probably a more realistic possibility, and besides some commodities are likely to be excepted. 
On this basis, the increase in Japanese imports would be somewhat less than $US 6.5 millions. 
There seem no strong grounds for Japan to oppose the provision of general trade preferences 
for fear of unmanageable increases in her imports. 
(ii) The Trade Diversion Effects : Decreases in Japan's txports 
A more serious problem for Japan is that her exports, particularly to North American 
markets, might suffer from the trade diversion effects of trade preferences extended by other 
developed countries to developing countries. A more complicated model is required in order 
to estimate the effects of both trade creation and trade diversion in a given developed country 
market, such as the United States. 
An estimate is attempted for nineteen manufactured commoditiesl5 of importance to 
developing countries which compete with Japanese exports in the American market. In 1964, 
United States' imports of these commodities were valued at $US 1,600 millions. Japan sup-
plied $US 450 millions and developing countries supplied $US 465 millions. The nineteen 
items cover almost all the manufactured and semi-manufactured goods for which developing 
countries, as well as Japan, seek larger markets in the United States. 
Let us suppose that the U.S. abolishes tariffs preferentially on the imports coming from 
developing countries while she retains tariffs on the imports from other developed countries. 
It is estimated according to our model that the developing countries would increase their 
exports to America by the amount of $US 176 millions or 37.8 per cent over the total 19 items 
13 A more detailed expl*anation is presented by Kiyoshi Kojima, "Trade Preferences for Developing 
Countries: A Japanese Assessment," Hitotsubashi Journal of Econo'nics, February 1969, pp. 1-12. 
14  hey are mostly labour-intensive manufactures: Irlywood, cotton yarn and thread, yarn and thread 
of synthetic fibres, cotton fabrics woven, floor coverings, clothing, footwear, articles of artificial plastic 
materials, travel goods and handbags, small-wares ancl toilet articles, children's toys, and lighters. 
15 Cotton fabrics woven, yarn of wool, wollen fabrics woven, jute fabrics woven, floor coverings, 
clothing, manufactures of leather, footwear, sporting goods, children's toys, articles of rubber, plywood, 
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on 1964 trade figures and enjoy an average rise of export prices of 18.3 per cent. 
On the other hand, $US 22.5 millions or 4.1 per cent of Japanese exports would be 
diverted to developing countries and Japanese export prices would be forced down on average 
by 2.0 per cent. Thus, the United States would increase her imports by $US 153.5 millions 
or about 10 per cent on 1964 figures-the difference between the increase in developing countries' 
exports and the reduction in Japan's exports. The increase in American imports is the trade 
creation effect of preferences resulting from the average fall of 2.0 per cent in American import 
prices inclusive of the tariff. 
The question is would the effect of trade diversion on Japanese exports be really serious? 
Although there have been some exaggerated estimates for' Japan, it is not likely tllat the 
effects would be nearly serious as is widely feared, as far as the static effects of preferences 
are concerned. 
(iii) Preferences through an "Advance Cut" 
Two alternative preference schemes have been presented to OECD countries : the advance 
cut plan advocated by the United States and the tariff quota plan supported by EEC countries. 
It has been suggested that the advance cut preference scheme could be applied either by 
reducing tariffs on developing country products to the full extent of concessions agreed under 
Kennedy Round negotiations or by reducing tariffs on developing country products under 
negotiations between developing countries and developed countries within GATT, to be followed 
by a new round of negotiations among developed countries designed to effect the staged 
reduction of MFN tariffs over 5 or 10 years. Either way, the advance cut plan ensures that 
general preferences are temporary and that they are consistent with progress towards global 
free trade. These are the significant merits of the advance cut proposals. 
On the other hand, the tariff quota scheme appears more open to protectionist abuses, 
and unlikely to promote trade liberalization in developed countries. Quotas on selected com-
modities from particular developing country sources would be subject to arbitrary alteration 
and MFN tariffs could even be raised to provide larger preference margins. Fundamentally, 
the tariff quota plan does not aim at progress towards global free trade but sets out to prevent 
"market disruption" by developing country products. From the standpoint of encouraging 
the expansion of world trade, the advance cut proposals seem preferable. 
Permanent preferences, i.e., general preferences with no limitation in duration, are certainly 
more favourable to less developed countries than the AC plan, but they will not be accorded 
by developed countries. It may be interesting, however, to illustrate the difference in effects 
of both schemes for the case of Japan. 
Let us suppose that (1) America imported in the initial year $US 600 millions from Japan 
and $US 400 mil]ions from developing countries, following closely to the 1964 trade figures ; 
(2) the American tariff level was 30 per cent ed valore'n ; (3) preferential margin equals 0.5 
both under the AC plan and the permanent preferences plan ; (4) tariffs are reduced by 10 
per cent every year for five years under the AC plan but they are reduced by 50 per cent 
from the flrst year under the permanent preferences plan ; (5) the price elasticity of American 
import-demand is taken as 2.5 and the price elasticity of export-supply frorn Japan 2.2 
throughout the five years ; and (6) the price elasticity of export-supply from developing countries 
will increase from 1.1 in the first year to 1,65, 2.2, 2.75 and 3.3 in successive years. 
Under these assumptions, over the whole five year period, Japanese exports would fall by 
$US 205 millions or 6.8 per cent under the permanent preferences plan, whilst they would 14 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [June 
increase by $US 306 millions or 10.2 per cent under the AC plan. 
Exports of developing countries would increase by $US 671 millions or 33.4 per cent in 
the case of the permanent preferences plan and by $US 514 millions or 23.7 per in the case 
of the AC plan. 
American imports would increase by $US 466 millions, i.e., net of increase from develop-
ing countries and decrease from Japan, in the case of the permanent preferences plan whilst 
they would increase by $US 820 millions, i.e, the sum of increase both from developing 
countries and Japan, in the case of the AC plan. 
Thus, it appears that a permanent preferences plan, if it were accorded, would be most 
favourable to developing countries. It should be noted, however, that increases in American 
imports which designates the degree of liberalization of world trade would be far larger in the 
case of the AC plan than permanent preferences plan. The more favourable effects for develop-
ing countries in the case of the permanent prefe_rences plan resulted from discrimination caused 
by trade diversion effects against Japan and not from the greater expansion of world trade. 
Japan has many interests in common with developing countries. She still depends heavily on 
the exports of traditional labour intensive manufactures in competition with developing countries 
but, Iike them, she desires freer access to developed country markets for these exports. 
It is important to emphasize that for developing countries, too, the benefits of trade 
preference schemes derive not so much from discrimination in tariff treatment but more from 
the reductl;on of tariffs in developed countries and also from the increase in productive capacity 
and competitiveness of exportable products from developing countries. It is of the utmost 
urgency to the developing countries that some .jolt be administered to the high-wage economies 
of the advanced nations so that protectionism is broken down and also so that they be given 
more eflicient assistance from the advanced countries to foster their infant industries. These 
aims would be realized most practically. 
(iv) PAFTA Aid cum Preference System 
What this study and others have shown is that the static effects of preference schemes 
are not likely to be substantial.16 The prospects are generally discouraging for deve]op[ng' 
countries. The benefits for them may be even too small to justify the cost of carrying out 
the cumbersome administration of preferential treatment. The increased earning power of 
developing countries which results from trade preference is certainly not likely to fill their 
huge foreign exchange gap.lT 
Moreover, there are conflicting interests among the potential preference receivers. The 
main interest of the less developed among the developing countries is not so much preferential 
tariff treatment on manufactured exports but, first, the expansion of traditional primary com-
modity exports and, second, the initiation of industrialization with heavy dependence on aid 
from developed countries. 
In fact, developed countries have been reluctantly lead towards the provision of general 
trade preferences, not because they expect any substantial benefits to flow to developing 
16 See, Gardner Patterson. Discrilninction in International Trade, The Policy Issues, 1945-1965, 
Princeton, 1966, pp. 358-359, pp. 381-383. John Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development. Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1967, Chap. 6. Pincus, ibid., p. 231, estimates that a general preference scheme 
could increase the export receipts of developing countries by the general order of $ I billion annually 
if processed products were included. This estimate is the largest at several estimates made. 
IT Grant L. Reuber, Caneda's Interest in the Trade Problems ofLess-Developed Countries, The Canadian 
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countries but because they recognize the political expedience of providing them. 
It may be true that if the effective rates of protection which are on average 1.5 or 2 times 
over the nominal tariff rates,18 and the dynamic effects of preferences are taken into account, 
the favourable effects of general preferences for less developed countries would be more sub-
stantia]. But these effects depend heavily upon the developed countries assistance of capital, 
know-how and management for establishing and rationalizing production facilities in develop-
ing countries. 
An aid cum preference scheme could offer more benefits to developing countries. Aid, 
linked directly to preferential tariff treatment, appears consistent with the Prebisch report's 
emphasis on the infant industry argument for preferences.19 Firstly, as proposed in previous 
sections, directly productive aid in the form of capital goods, advanced techniques of produc-
tion, managerial know-how and worker training, should be provided to developing countries 
on an increasingly large scale if the efflciency of new export-oriented industries, primary as 
well as manufacturing, is to be improved to the point where they become increasingly com-
petitive in world markets. Secondly, developed countries should provide preferential treatment, 
say for five or ten years, to developing country exports launched with the help of directly 
productive aid. Preferences aimed at ensuring wider markets would serve as a sort of aid 
after care and mrght well be regarded as mdlspensable to realizing the full benefits of aid. 
It is important that the provision of preferences should be closely linked with the provision 
of aid since either is likely to be ineffective and result in a waste of resources if applied 
independently. 
The aid cum preference scheme need not be confined to manufactured goods. It could 
also be useful for agricultural and mineral commodities of interest to developing countries. 
Commonly, however, developed country tariffs on these latter products are very low or non-
existent and there is little margin for granting preferences. In such cases, governments of 
the developed countries could provide a subsidy on imports from the developing countries for 
some specific period, say five years, until competitiveness is sufflciently well established.20 
It is clear that a large-scale scheme of aid cum preference could be provided more effi-
ciently and without much difficulty by a group of like-minded advanced countries. This suggests 
the advisability of a Free Trade Area Aid cum Preference System. 
The optimum arrangements for the less developed countries would be for, as rapid as 
possible, a reduction and elimination of barriers on their exports to FTA countries, combined 
wrth the slow and gradual elimmatron of barners among FTA countnes. It might be best 
to establish a FTA by eliminating tariffs gradually within ten to fifteen years but to reduce 
tariffs on developing countries products from the first year to the full extent, following on 
18 See. Harry G. Johnson, "Trade Preferences and Developing Countries," Lloyds Bank Review April 
1966, pp. 13-17, and Bela Balassa, "The Structure of Protection in the Industrial Countries and its Effects 
on the Exports of Processed Goods from Developing Countries," IBRD Report, No. EC-152a, February 
1968. _ 
19 United Nations, Towards a New Trade Policy for Development, New York, 1964. 
20 As a kind of aid, Japan has stressed "development investment for imports," i.e., to assist the de-
velopment of primary products in developing countries with the aim of importing raw materials and 
foodstuffs most needed for the Japanese economy at a cheaper price and from a stable source. Thailand's 
export of maize to Japan is a ~ood example. In order to promote this, an "Agency for Asian Trade 
and Development" will be establrshed under the support of the Japanese Mmlstry of Internatronal Trade 
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the principle of an advance cut plan. At the same time, FTA governments could increase 
directly productive aid and encourage the flow of private investment to developing countries 
which would be stimulated by these trade measures. 
The FTA aid cum preference system has a number of advantages, including greater 
feasibility, over the general preference system considered by UNCTAD. There have been 
excellently summarized by David Wall as follow~.:21 
"In the first place, the spirit behind the FTA movement is based on belief in the benefits 
to be gained from free trade and the concessions called for in the proposed preference system 
would represent a more extensive diffusion of this particular spirit. 
Secondly if FTA was to be successfull t bl' hed its members would be better off 
and consequently able to bear the cost of the peference system more easily, which contrasts 
with the UNCTAD scheme that incorporates no quid pro quo for developed countries. 
Thirdly, the extension of preferences by FTA as a group would ensure that the burden 
of accommodating those preferences would be shared as broadly as possible. 
In addition, such action would reverse the tendency for the world to break, up into 
discriminatory trading blocs bent on protecting the interests of producers within each bloc."22 
It should be stressed again that the jolt to the economies of the developed countries which 
the provision of preferences to the less developed countries entails would be alleviated by the 
formation of FTA. The creation of FTA implies that each member would be prepared, even-
tually, to adjust to full competition from other member countries. Only with such commit-
ments would FTA countries be ready to provide preferences to developing countries more 
widely and effectively. It is practically impossible under present world trade policies to abolish 
non-tariff restrictions. The abolition of non-tariff restrictions could be realized between FTA 
members and the benefits extended to associated developing countries. Thus, the commodity 
coverage for reducing both tariffs and other trade barriers in favour of less developed countries 
would be much greater under FTA preference than under the UNCTAD scheme. Tariffs 
and other trade barriers for less developed countries would be completely eliminated by FTA 
preferences while only a fifty per cent reduction of tariffs might be the largest feasible 
tariff cut under the UNCTAD scheme. In addition, greater assistanc~ from FTA countries 
would be assured. Thus, the FTA aid cum preference system would be more beneficial to 
less developed countries than a general system of preferences considered by UNCTAD.23 
FTA preferences along the lines of the advance cut plan would automatically assure that 
the advantages to developing nation exporters would last as long as the period over which 
FTA members gradually removed barriers to trade among themselves, and also with respect 
to FTA imports from third party developed countries. On this point, it may appear to the 
less developed countries that FTA preferences would be less beneficial than permanent general 
preferences. It should be noted, however, that any preference scheme should not be allowed 
to be permanent. The duration of the preference scheme should be long enough to allow 
zl David Wall, The Third World Challenge, Preferences for Development, The Atlantic Trade Study, 
London, 1967, p. 65. 
22 The UNCTAD scheme of general preferences creates new discrimination, while FTA preference 
would prevent increased discrimination. 
23 It should be remembered why the British Commonwealth preference has been beneficial to develop-
ing countries. Beneficial effects have been brought about mainly from all-round assistance in capital, 
management, marketing., etc., but not so much from preference itself. See. Donald MacDougall and 
Rosemary Hutt "Imperlal Preference A Quantltatrve Analysls " Economrc Journal June 1954, p. 269. 1969] AslAN DEVELOPlNG COUNTRIES AND PAFTA: DEVELoplvlENT, AID /lND TRADE PREFERENCES 17 
the successful establishment of some industries, but not so long as to encourage the establish-
ment of industries in which developing nations have no prospects of long term comparative 
advan tage . 
It might be claimed by the less developed countries that the FTA preference system is not 
general as regards countries which provide preferences, since the free trade area is unlikely 
cover the all developed countries. However, Iess developed countries may become associated 
with more than one FTA and receive preferential treatrnent from all that were prepared to 
provide it. Moreover, advanced countries could belong to more than one FTA. This pos-
sibility arises from the characteristics of free trade areas, which differ from customs union or 
more solid political unions. If more free trade areas provide non-discriminative preferences 
to a.ny less developed countries generally, FTA preferences would really become more general 
and effective than those intended under the UNCTAD scheme. 
V. Conclusion 
The establishment of Pacific Free Trade Area or an alternative organization has the 
twin ob'e t  J c ives of providing a step towards free world trade and of assisting more effectively 
the less developed economies particularly in Southeast Asia, in their efforts to develop. This 
paper has examined how the Pacific advanced countries can cooperate to increase directly 
productive aid for food production, cash-crop plantations, and manufacturing industries to the 
Asian developing countries. It has also recommended that FTA preferences should be provided 
in close association with aid efforts. 
To make those aid cum preference efforts fruitful both for the Pacific advanced coun-
tries and Asian developing countries, three steps are necessary. Firstly, trade liberalization 
among the Pacific advanced countries, preferably through the formation of a Pacific Free 
Trade Area, is a prerequisite for increasing their aid-giving capacity and for providing the 
necessary jolt to carry out structural adjustment which will allow the absorption of increased 
imports from developing countries. Secondly, the structural adjustment of industries in advanced 
countries is a key factor in the success of the entire PAFTA aid cum preference system. 
Tllirdly, it goes without saying that efforts of self-help considered policies for economic develop-
ment in Asian developing countries are essential to the success of the scheme. Finally, im-
proved financial arrangements in the Asian-Pacific region would facilitate the implementation 
of these trade and development policies. 
, 